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Beyond Assimilationism and Differentialism
Comment on Glock
Geert Keil
In a number of articles, Hans-Johann Glock has argued against the “lingualist” view 
that higher mental capacities are a prerogative of language-users. He has defended the 
“assimilationist” claim that the mental capacities of humans and of non-human ani-
mals differ only in degree. In the paper under discussion, Glock argues that animals are 
capable of acting for reasons, provided that reasons are construed along the lines of the 
new “objectivist” theory of practical reasons.
1. Humans as paradigm cases
It is notoriously hard to specify necessary and suffi cient conditions for intentional phe-
nomena such as believing, desiring, having intentions, or acting for reasons. Without 
any doubt, however, human beings are paradigmatic instances. It cannot turn out that 
no human has ever held a belief, formed an intention, or acted on a reason. No other 
animal plays this paradigmatic role.
Paradigm case arguments have often been misused to advance dogmatic assertions. 
Wittgenstein’s under-argued dictum, “We only say of a human being and what is like 
one that it thinks”,1 is a case in point. By contrast, my claim is quite modest. It is 
simply that humans have various mental abilities while it is at least an open question 
whether other animals exhibit a similar mentality. 
This being said, the question presents itself as to how similar and in what respects a 
non-human animal must be similar in order to join the club. Note that this top-down 
approach to the issue of animal mentality is not biased in favour of “differentialism” 
and against “assimilationism”, in the sense that Glock uses these terms: “Differential-
ists maintain that there are crucial qualitative differences separating us from animals. 
Assimilationists maintain that the differences are merely quantitative and gradual.”2 
The how-similar approach does not prejudge this issue. Both extreme confi dence and 
extreme skepticism about animal minds remain live options. Other research projects 
such as the bottom-up question of how cognitive abilities evolved remain perfectly le-
gitimate. The point of the how-similar approach is just to circumvent, for the present 
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purpose, the intricate project of devising necessary and suffi cient conditions for mental 
phenomena. If any non-human animal should be capable of believing, forming an in-
tention, or acting on a reason, then its abilities must be suffi ciently similar to paradig-
matic instances, however ill-understood the phenomenon is.
2. On similarities and differences
Similarity comes cheap. Everything is like everything else, and in endless ways. If meant 
to be informative, a statement of similarity must be related to some point of compari-
son. Furthermore, in many of the relevant respects, similarity is a matter of degree. 
As regards the similarities between humans and non-human animals, we can say a 
little more. First, a genus proximum suggests itself. Both are animals. Second, we have 
selected, for the present purpose, a point of comparison: their abilities. When com-
paring the abilities of human and nonhuman animals, we fi nd numerous and striking 
similarities as well as dissimilarities. Most similarities are grounded in biology. Both 
humans and other animals have needs, live and die, reproduce, have sense organs, can 
move around, must show a certain amount of fl exibility in their behaviour to stay alive. 
None of these common features hold for inanimate substances and artifacts. On the 
other hand, there are striking dissimilarities. Humans have invented science, moral-
ity, law, religion, poetry, irony, and philosophy. They transcend their cognitive niche 
by building telescopes, microscopes, Geiger counters and large hadron colliders. All 
humans by nature desire knowledge, even where no evolutionary benefi t awaits. They 
know right and wrong, though not always right from wrong. They wonder about ani-
mal rights, while no other animal has ever wondered about human rights. Most nota-
bly, humans outperform other animals in a respect that marks the fairest conceivable 
standard: killing and avoiding being killed. Humans have devised means to defend 
their lives against tigers, rattlesnakes and scorpions. Conversely, the animals have not. 
Against our weapons, they are deplorably helpless.
Given these long, incomplete lists of similarities and differences, the battle of the 
giants  between “assimilationism” and “differentialism” loses much of its bite. Both the 
similarities and the differences between human and non-human animals are numerous, 
striking and relevant. Insisting exclusively on one of the two lists verges on being silly.
3. Differences in kind and differences in degree
Even if a point of comparison has been agreed upon, the problem remains that similar-
ity is a matter of degree. Most or even all mental abilities admit of degrees. A telling 
sign is the large number of modifi er phrases to be found in the literature on animal men-
tality. Here is a selection, taken from Glock’s and Birnbacher’s papers in this volume: 
“only in an attenuated sense”, “at least rudimentary kinds of”, “not in a full-blown 
sense”, “at least simple judgments or beliefs”, “reason in the fullest sense”. These mod-
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ifi ers grade the degree of possession of mental abilities, and of the applicability of the 
respective predicates.
A strong argument for such gradation – though not for assimilationism – is provided 
by the brute facts of biological evolution and ontogenetic development. Mental abili-
ties have not been around for all time, but they now exist. Arguably, they have evolved 
through intermediate stages. The question as to when exactly an emerging ability F 
began to deserve its name seems otiose. The same holds for ontogeny. On what day of 
his life did Little Hanjo carry out his fi rst act of deliberation? What was the fi rst action 
that he did for a reason? There seems to be no fact of the matter. As Wittgenstein once 
put it: “Light dawns gradually over the whole”.3 
I insist that this holistic response as such neither supports assimilationism nor 
differentialism. Glock seems to think otherwise. He wonders how Wittgenstein’s “holis-
tic lingualism”, can “do justice to the intermediary stages involved in every dawn”4, 
in particular, to the “stages that lie between the human infant, who can neither act for 
reasons nor refl ect on them, and the adult, who can both?” (911)5 Now, what would
“doing justice to intermediary stages” amount to? Are new terms needed that de-
note proto-intentions and proto-deliberations? We may say that “proto-delibera-
tion” is such a term. It comes cheap, just as modifi ers like “in an attenuated sense” 
and “at least rudimentary kinds of” do. Contrary to what Glock suggests, the awk-
wardness involved in fi nding apt descriptions of the intermediate stages of cognitive de-
velopment has nothing to do with differentialism or with lingualist assumptions about 
the mind. Glock’s own account does not fare better. As speakers of a natural language, 
we are all in the same boat insofar as our intentional vocabulary is tailor-made for 
the fully developed phenomenon: for the mental capacities and performances of adult 
specimens of our species. All cases that fall short of the paradigm − infants, severely 
mentally retarded or handicapped persons, nonhuman animals, robots – put us in a 
quandary.
This quandary is familiar to us from the debate on semantic vagueness. Vague predi-
cates admit borderline cases and give rise to the paradox of the heap. Where is the line 
between red and orange, where does baldness begin, what makes a heap a heap, when 
did Little Hanjo form his fi rst intention? It is tempting to turn the insight that cogni-
tive abilities come in degrees into an argument for assimilationism. But the temptation 
should be resisted. Continuity as such does not speak for assimilationism any more 
than the existence of borderline cases speaks for the nonexistence of clear-cut cases. 
The lesson to be drawn from the Sorites paradox is that the nonexistence of a sharp 
cut-off is compatible with the existence of clear-cut cases. The difference in hairiness 
between Telly Savalas and Reinhold Messner is a clear as can be. Obviously, smooth-
ness of transition, and even perceptual indistinguishability between neighbouring ele-
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ments in a Sorites series, can go along with striking differences between starting point 
and end point. The similarity relation is not transitive.
Assimilationists hold that the mental abilities of humans and non-human animals 
differ only in degree. Differentialists hold that they differ in kind. Now what exactly is 
the difference between a vast gradual difference and a difference in kind? Is there a fact 
of the matter? As long as neither camp has solved the Sorites paradox, the question as 
to whether a certain difference in a mental ability is gradual or qualitative strikes me 
as ill-defi ned.
On closer observation, Glock’s own views about animal minds are anything but 
gradualist. His main criterion for animal rationality is that the animal’s behaviour be 
“plastic, responsive to altering circumstances” (902). Such plasticity is exhibited only 
by “some higher animals” whose problem-solving strategies “are not innate or result 
from rigid stimulus-response patterns” (ibid.). Accordingly, Glock has a differentialist 
view concerning the relation between non-rational and rational animals. He just draws 
the line elsewhere in the animal kingdom, compared to anthropological differentialism. 
Hence he himself faces the hard question of where to draw the line. If primates, cats, 
dogs and crows exhibit enough plasticity and fl exibility in their behaviour while, say, 
fruit fl ies do not, then at what point exactly did these features come into existence in 
evolutionary history? It is very plausible that for any proposed demarcation, the animal 
kingdom will supply intermediate stages and borderline cases.
So be it. Plausibly, animal rationality and animal mentality in all their dimensions 
and aspects come in degrees. Still, evolutionary continuity does not suffi ce to support 
assimilationist views. As long as the difference between a vast gradual difference and a 
difference in kind resists analysis, the question of whether the mental abilities of human 
and non-human animals differ in kind or in degree is ill-defi ned. Far from supporting 
one of the parties, the availability of Soritean little-by-little arguments to absurd con-
clusions shows how futile and unhelpful the large-scale distinction between assimila-
tionism and differentialism is. 
4. The case against lingualism: Who is begging the question?
“Lingualism” about animal mentality, according to Glock, “maintains on a priori con-
ceptual grounds that their lack of language precludes animals from possessing mental 
capacities at all, or at least the ‘higher’ mental capacities required for agency” (900). 
“Lingualist skepticism about animal mentality”6 is the main target of his criticism. 
Given his defi nition of “lingualism”, all lingualist arguments to the effect that certain 
capacities are a prerogative of language-users turn out to be question-begging.
Glock construes lingualism as an a priori claim. This move is conducive to shifting 
the burden of proof to the lingualist. But why should a Davidsonian lingualist accept 
this move? He might invoke Morgan’s canon instead and argue that behavioural evi-
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dence alone does not suffi ce to ascribe the higher mental capacities required for genuine 
agency. Being able to communicate one’s attitudes to other language users would suf-
fi ce, but since this ability presupposes sharing a language, it cannot serve for Glock as 
a touchstone of higher mental capacities. Those who give language-involving capaci-
ties centre stage, on the other hand, might well argue that their centrality shows that 
having a language matters. There is no easy way out of this dialectical situation. In the 
absence of independent arguments, dismissing a “lingualist” and “excessively intellec-
tualist […] picture of human action”7 does not cut much ice. In an undemanding sense, 
animals can surely perform “actions”.8
I agree that there is an air of apriorism to some of Davidson’s arguments against 
animal mentality. Pressing the distinction between empirical and a priori grounds too 
hard is, however, unwise. It is known from other cases that fi rmly established empirical 
correlations in the long run tend to become entrenched as conceptual connections.
Critics of lingualism hold that animals can entertain those beliefs and thoughts that 
do not require linguistic representation. Some lingualists claim that this class is empty. 
Ruth Millikan argues that mental states of a certain kind, namely those with a propo-
sitional structure, require the possession of theoretical “unicepts”, which only humans 
have developed.9 Similarly, Davidson does not make linguistic capacities obligatory on 
a priori grounds, but because they are required for the ability to grasp propositions: 
“Language is the organ of propositional perception. Seeing sights and hearing sounds 
does not require thoughts with propositional content; perceiving how things are does, 
and this ability develops along with language.”10 For the purpose of pinpointing the 
anthropological difference, this is the right line to take, I think. The challenge for the 
assimilationist is that the class of language-involving mental states is so large. It is not 
just that some thoughts and ideas never occur to non-human animals, in the way that 
I often think about soccer while my wife couldn’t care less. The point is rather that a 
huge and highly relevant class of beliefs, desires, thoughts, and intentions is beyond 
the reach of nun-human animals, because they do not possess, and cannot acquire, the 
required concepts.
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5. Acting for reasons − can objectivism about practical reasons help? 
Glock’s main concern in his paper is the capacity to act for reasons. He claims that 
many non-human animals share this capacity and he tries to support his view by invok-
ing the new “objectivistic” account of practical reasons, according to which reasons 
are facts or states of affairs, rather than beliefs or belief-desire pairs. The objectivistic 
theory, according to Glock, “removes an important obstacle to crediting animals with 
the capacity to act for reasons” (907).
This move strikes me as audacious, since the objectivistic theory has a number of 
well-known shortcomings in its original application to human agency. It would be quite 
surprising if these shortcomings could be remedied by extending, or misapplying, the 
theory to new cases.
The new theory is opposed to the received view, as held by Hume and Davidson. 
Here is a concise expression of the received view: “Your stepping on my toes neither 
explains nor justifi es my stepping on your toes unless I believe you stepped on my toes, 
but the belief alone, true or false, explains my action”.11 Glock calls the received belief/
desire theory “subjectivist” and depicts the objectivist alternative thus: “In so far as the 
reasons for which an agent acts can be said to be beliefs and desires at all, they are not 
subjective states of believing or desiring, but what is believed or what is desired” (905).
In the remainder of this comment, I shall argue that objectivism about practical rea-
sons does not help to defend the claim that non-human animals can act for reasons. My 
views are the following:
(i)  The ontological question as to what practical reasons essentially are, either 
mental states or facts, sets the debate on the wrong track.
(ii)  Both the objectivist and the subjectivist theory have both absurd and acceptable 
readings. 
(iii)  On the readings that make them acceptable, both theories converge. 
(iv)  On these readings, animals cannot act for reasons.
I cannot explain and defend these views in detail here. To begin with, let us take a look 
at how Glock advances the objectivist view: “My reason for Φ-ing is what I would or 
could specify in a sincere response to the question ‘Why are you Φ-ing?’” (906). I agree. 
Reasons are answers to why-questions. (Should I add that animals do not put and an-
swer such questions?) Then Glock provides a piece of linguistic evidence: “And this an-
swer typically takes the form ‘Because p’ rather than ‘Because I believe that p’” (ibid.) 
Agreed, again. The agent would however not answer “Because p” unless he believed 
that p. Remember Davidson’s vignette: The mere fact that someone stepped on my toes 
does not explain my vengeful mood, but my belief does. The crucial point is that in giv-
ing the answer “Because p” it is tacitly understood that I believe that p. It would be 
redundant and, for Gricean reasons, even inappropriate for me to mention my belief 
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rather than the believed fact. Hence, the proferred piece of linguistic evidence does not 
at all speak against the belief/desire theory. 
Glock continues: “My reason for taking an umbrella is that it is raining, not that 
I believe that it is raining; for it is the weather rather than my own mental state that 
makes taking an umbrella good in my eyes” (ibid.). As is generally known, “belief” is 
multiply ambiguous. In the present context, the ambiguity between what is believed 
and the mental state of believing is relevant. Objectivists typically use the content-state 
ambiguity in order to portray the subjectivist theory as absurd. Glock is no exception. 
He claims that Davidson holds the following: “In Davidson, for instance, A’s reason 
for Φ-ing is roughly speaking A’s mental state of believing that p will lead to q, in com-
bination with her mental state of desiring that q” (908). This is very roughly speaking. 
Glock resolves the content-state ambiguity in an uncharitable way, and actually at odds 
with what Davidson explicitly says in many places.
In Davidson’s theory of action explanation, mental attitudes play a dual role. They 
both cause and rationalize the action. On closer inspection, though, the item that 
causes and the item that rationalizes fall apart. It is the occurrence of the attitude, i. e. 
the mental event, which causes the action, while it is the content of the attitude which 
rationalizes the action. The causal relation holds between two occurrences, that is, be-
tween the mental event and the bodily movement. The relation of rationalization holds 
between the propositional content of the mental attitude and the description of the 
action. In the slogan “reasons are causes”, sometimes regarded as the hallmark of Da-
vidson’s theory, these subtleties get lost. But compare what Davidson actually says: “the
propositional contents of the explaining attitudes and beliefs must bear a certain logi-
cal relation to the description under which the action is explained”.12 The undisputed 
fact that propositional contents and action descriptions cannot be causally related cre-
ates serious trouble for the alignment of the causal part of Davidson’s theory, but this 
is not our topic today.
In Davidson’s theory of reasons explanations, the content-state ambiguity of the 
term “belief” is resolved in favour of belief contents. Now for the objectivist theory, 
or rather for Glock’s version of it. Glock does not simply state that reasons are facts 
rather than beliefs. His views are more subtle: “Reasons […] are not subjective states 
of believing or desiring, but what is believed or what is desired. […] An agent A […] is 
capable of acting for a reason iff A can act in the light of reasons, that is, in the light of 
facts (as A sees them).” (905)
I fail to see the dramatic difference between this account and a non-absurd reading 
of the received view. Acting for reasons means acting “in the light of facts”, to which 
Glock adds the subjectivist clause “as A sees them”. The clause accounts for the prob-
lem, fatal to crude versions of objectivism, that the mere presence of some unperceived 
fact in the agent’s surroundings will not elicit, let alone motivate, any reaction from 
him. Taking Glock’s subjectivist addendum seriously, a better way to express his view 
would be that, rather than being identical to reasons, facts yield reasons. Both Glock 
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and Davidson leave some conceptual slack between the equated items. For Davidson, 
giving a reason is a matter of naming attitudes, rather than its consisting of these atti-
tudes.13 In Glock, the slack is provided by the “in the light of”-relation. What matters 
is not the ‘illuminated’ entity but the agent’s acting in the light of it, thereby adopting 
the fact as a reason.
I submit that on charitable readings, both theories of practical reasons show a high 
degree of convergence. But instead of tracing in detail the required exegetical clarifi ca-
tions and refi nements, I shall state in my own words why the question as to what rea-
sons essentially are, viz. either mental states or facts, is misleading, and second, why 
a non-misleading account of what it takes to act for a reason is bad news for Glock’s 
crediting animals with this capacity.
Reasons are answers to why-questions. Practical reasons are answers to the question 
of why someone has done something. The question as to which ontological category 
reasons belong leads us astray. What sheds light on the phenomenon is the practice of 
giving reasons, rather than the thing given. The point of this practice lies not in what 
is being mentioned, but in the relation between what is mentioned and what it is men-
tioned for. Citing something as a reason is to characterize the item relationally.14 
Plausible versions of subjectivism and objectivism coincide in citing what is believed 
and what is desired, hence propositional contents, as reasons. A propositional con-
tent is not a reason, but becomes one if it is adduced in the appropriate justifi catory 
context. Facts obtain, beliefs are held, but reasons only come into existence by being 
adopted as reasons. 
Now if something along these lines is correct, then the problem with non-human 
animals is that they are not engaged in the practice of giving and taking reasons. They 
cannot represent their beliefs, if they have any, as something that speaks for or against 
an action. The “in-the-light-of”-relation is opaque to them. The light being shed is in 
the eye of the beholder.
Glock is remarkably close to such a view of practical reasoning when he holds that 
“what counts instead [of conscious processes of reasoning] is the capacity of the agent 
A, for instance, the ability to justify her beliefs and actions”.15 This is grist to my mill. 
What counts is, in a nutshell, the capacity of logon didonai. This is bad news for assim-
ilationism, since justifying one’s actions by giving reasons is a capacity that nonhuman 
animals undisputedly lack. Logon didonai, the ability to give reasons, does not only 
matter for action explanations, it matters crucially for pinpointing the anthropologi-
cal difference. Insisting, as Glock does, that animals are nevertheless capable of acting 
for reasons, since “acting purposively or in pursuit of a goal qualifi es as acting for a 
reason” (904), and furthermore, since facts obtain in the light of which their behaviour
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is purposive, strikes me as a misuse of the phrase “acting for a reason”. Exhibiting 
behaviour that is evaluable in the light of facts by sensible evaluators is quite unlike 
being able to make up one’s mind about what speaks for an action and acting on such 
considerations. Using the same description for such different phenomena is not illumi-
nating.16
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